2023-08-03 22:35:31 +00:00
|
|
|
\appendix
|
2023-08-05 22:11:55 +00:00
|
|
|
\chapter{Taxation.}
|
2023-08-03 21:50:47 +00:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
It was a principle of the Common Law, as it is of the law of nature, and
|
|
|
|
of common sense, that no man can be taxed without his personal consent.
|
|
|
|
The Common Law knew nothing of that system, which now prevails in
|
|
|
|
England, of _assuming_ a man's own consent to be taxed, because some
|
|
|
|
pretended representative, whom he never authorized to act for him, has
|
|
|
|
taken it upon himself to consent that he may be taxed. That is one of
|
|
|
|
the many frauds on the Common Law, and the English constitution, which
|
|
|
|
have been introduced since Magna Carta. Having finally established
|
|
|
|
itself in England, it has been stupidly and servilely copied and
|
|
|
|
submitted to in the United States.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the trial by jury were reëstablished, the Common Law principle of
|
|
|
|
taxation would be reëstablished with it; for it is not to be supposed
|
|
|
|
that juries would enforce a tax upon an individual which he had never
|
|
|
|
agreed to pay. Taxation without consent is as plainly robbery, when
|
|
|
|
enforced against one man, as when enforced against millions; and it is
|
|
|
|
not to be imagined that juries could be blind to so self-evident a
|
|
|
|
principle. Taking a man's money without his consent, is also as much
|
|
|
|
robbery, when it is done by millions of men, acting in concert, and
|
|
|
|
calling themselves a government, as when it is done by a single
|
|
|
|
individual, acting on his own responsibility, and calling himself a
|
|
|
|
highwayman. Neither the numbers engaged in the act, nor the different
|
|
|
|
characters they assume as a cover for the act, alter the nature of the
|
|
|
|
act itself.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If the government can take a man's money without his consent, there is
|
|
|
|
no limit to the additional tyranny it may practise upon him; for, with
|
|
|
|
his money, it can hire soldiers to stand over him, keep him in
|
|
|
|
subjection, plunder him at discretion, and kill him if he resists. And
|
|
|
|
governments always will do this, as they everywhere and always have done
|
|
|
|
it, except where the Common Law principle has been established. It is
|
|
|
|
therefore a first principle, a very _sine qua non_ of political freedom,
|
|
|
|
that a man can be taxed only by his personal consent. And the
|
|
|
|
establishment of this principle, with _trial by jury_, insures freedom
|
|
|
|
of course; because: 1. No man would pay his money unless he had first
|
|
|
|
contracted for such a government as he was willing to support; and, 2.
|
|
|
|
Unless the government then kept itself within the terms of its contract,
|
|
|
|
juries would not enforce the payment of the tax. Besides, the agreement
|
|
|
|
to be taxed would probably be entered into but for a year at a time. If,
|
|
|
|
in that year, the government proved itself either inefficient or
|
|
|
|
tyrannical, to any serious degree, the contract would not be renewed.
|
|
|
|
The dissatisfied parties, if sufficiently numerous for a new
|
|
|
|
organization, would form themselves into a separate association for
|
|
|
|
mutual protection. If not sufficiently numerous for that purpose, those
|
|
|
|
who were conscientious would forego all governmental protection, rather
|
|
|
|
than contribute to the support of a government which they deemed unjust.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
All legitimate government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily
|
|
|
|
agreed upon by the parties to it, for the protection of their rights
|
|
|
|
against wrong-doers. In its voluntary character it is precisely similar
|
|
|
|
to an association for mutual protection against fire or shipwreck.
|
|
|
|
Before a man will join an association for these latter purposes, and pay
|
|
|
|
the premium for being insured, he will, if he be a man of sense, look at
|
|
|
|
the articles of the association; see what the company promises to do;
|
|
|
|
what it is likely to do; and what are the rates of insurance. If he be
|
|
|
|
satisfied on all these points, he will become a member, pay his premium
|
|
|
|
for a year, and then hold the company to its contract. If the conduct of
|
|
|
|
the company prove unsatisfactory, he will let his policy expire at the
|
|
|
|
end of the year for which he has paid; will decline to pay any further
|
|
|
|
premiums, and either seek insurance elsewhere, or take his own risk
|
|
|
|
without any insurance. And as men act in the insurance of their ships
|
|
|
|
and dwellings, they would act in the insurance of their properties,
|
|
|
|
liberties and lives, in the political association, or government.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The political insurance company, or government, have no more right, in
|
|
|
|
nature or reason, to _assume_ a man's consent to be protected by them,
|
|
|
|
and to be taxed for that protection, when he has given no actual
|
|
|
|
consent, than a fire or marine insurance company have to assume a man's
|
|
|
|
consent to be protected by them, and to pay the premium, when his actual
|
|
|
|
consent has never been given. To take a man's property without his
|
|
|
|
consent is robbery; and to assume his consent, where no actual consent
|
|
|
|
is given, makes the taking none the less robbery. If it did, the
|
|
|
|
highwayman has the same right to assume a man's consent to part with his
|
|
|
|
purse, that any other man, or body of men, can have. And his assumption
|
|
|
|
would afford as much moral justification for his robbery as does a like
|
|
|
|
assumption, on the part of the government, for taking a man's property
|
|
|
|
without his consent. The government's pretence of protecting him, as an
|
|
|
|
equivalent for the taxation, affords no justification. It is for himself
|
|
|
|
to decide whether he desires such protection as the government offers
|
|
|
|
him. If he do not desire it, or do not bargain for it, the government
|
|
|
|
has no more right than any other insurance company to impose it upon
|
|
|
|
him, or make him pay for it.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Trial by the country, and no taxation without consent, were the two
|
|
|
|
pillars of English liberty, (when England had any liberty,) and the
|
|
|
|
first principles of the Common Law. They mutually sustain each other;
|
|
|
|
and neither can stand without the other. Without both, no people have
|
|
|
|
any guaranty for their freedom; with both, no people can be otherwise
|
|
|
|
than free.[118]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
By what force, fraud, and conspiracy, on the part of kings, nobles, and
|
|
|
|
"a few wealthy freeholders," these pillars have been prostrated in
|
|
|
|
England, it is designed to show more fully in the next volume, if it
|
|
|
|
should be necessary.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[Footnote 118: Trial by the country, and no taxation without consent,
|
|
|
|
mutually sustain each other, and can be sustained only by each other,
|
|
|
|
for these reasons: 1. Juries would refuse to enforce a tax against a man
|
|
|
|
who had never agreed to pay it. They would also protect men in forcibly
|
|
|
|
resisting the collection of taxes to which they had never consented.
|
|
|
|
Otherwise the jurors would authorize the government to tax themselves
|
|
|
|
without their consent,--a thing which no jury would be likely to do. In
|
|
|
|
these two ways, then, trial by the country would sustain the principle
|
|
|
|
of no taxation without consent. 2. On the other hand, the principle of
|
|
|
|
no taxation without consent would sustain the trial by the country,
|
|
|
|
because men in general would not consent to be taxed for the support of
|
|
|
|
a government under which trial by the country was not secured. Thus
|
|
|
|
these two principles mutually sustain each other.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
But, if either of these principles were broken down, the other would
|
|
|
|
fall with it, and for these reasons: 1. If trial by the country were
|
|
|
|
broken down, the principle of no taxation without consent would fall
|
|
|
|
with it, because the government would then be _able_ to tax the people
|
|
|
|
without their consent, inasmuch as the legal tribunals would be mere
|
|
|
|
tools of the government, and would enforce such taxation, and punish men
|
|
|
|
for resisting such taxation, as the government ordered. 2. On the other
|
|
|
|
hand, if the principle of no taxation without consent were broken down,
|
|
|
|
trial by the country would fall with it, because the government, if it
|
|
|
|
could tax people without their consent, would, of course, take enough of
|
|
|
|
their money to enable it to employ all the force necessary for
|
|
|
|
sustaining its own tribunals, (in the place of juries,) and carrying
|
|
|
|
their decrees into execution.]
|