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+CHAPTER X.
+
+MORAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR JURORS.
+
+
+The trial by jury must, if possible, be construed to be such that a man
+can rightfully sit in a jury, and unite with his fellows in giving
+judgment. But no man can rightfully do this, unless he hold in his own
+hand alone a veto upon any judgment or sentence whatever to be rendered
+by the jury against a defendant, which veto he must be permitted to use
+according to his own discretion and conscience, and not bound to use
+according to the dictation of either legislatures or judges.
+
+The prevalent idea, that a juror may, at the mere dictation of a
+legislature or a judge, and without the concurrence of his own
+conscience or understanding, declare a man "_guilty_," and thus in
+effect license the government to punish him; and that the legislature or
+the judge, and not himself, has in that case all the moral
+responsibility for the correctness of the principles on which the
+judgment was rendered, is one of the many gross impostures by which it
+could hardly have been supposed that any sane man could ever have been
+deluded, but which governments have nevertheless succeeded in inducing
+the people at large to receive and act upon.
+
+As a moral proposition, it is perfectly self-evident that, unless juries
+have all the legal rights that have been claimed for them in the
+preceding chapters,--that is, the rights of judging what the law is,
+whether the law be a just one, what evidence is admissible, what weight
+the evidence is entitled to, whether an act were done with a criminal
+intent, and the right also to _limit_ the sentence, free of all
+dictation from any quarter,--they have no _moral_ right to sit in the
+trial at all, and cannot do so without making themselves accomplices in
+any injustice that they may have reason to believe may result from
+their verdict. It is absurd to say that they have no moral
+responsibility for the use that may be made of their verdict by the
+government, when they have reason to suppose it will be used for
+purposes of injustice.
+
+It is, for instance, manifestly absurd to say that jurors have no moral
+responsibility for the enforcement of an unjust law, when they consent
+to render a verdict of _guilty_ for the transgression of it; which
+verdict they know, or have good reason to believe, will be used by the
+government as a justification for inflicting a penalty.
+
+It is absurd, also, to say that jurors have no moral responsibility for
+a punishment inflicted upon a man _against law_, when, at the dictation
+of a judge as to what the law is, they have consented to render a
+verdict against their own opinions of the law.
+
+It is absurd, too, to say that jurors have no moral responsibility for
+the conviction and punishment of an innocent man, when they consent to
+render a verdict against him on the strength of evidence, or laws of
+evidence, dictated to them by the court, if any evidence or laws of
+evidence have been excluded, which _they_ (the jurors) think ought to
+have been admitted in his defence.
+
+It is absurd to say that jurors have no moral responsibility for
+rendering a verdict of "_guilty_" against a man, for an act which he did
+not know to be a crime, and in the commission of which, therefore, he
+could have had no criminal intent, in obedience to the instructions of
+courts that "ignorance of the law (that is, of crime) excuses no one."
+
+It is absurd, also, to say that jurors have no moral responsibility for
+any cruel or unreasonable _sentence_ that may be inflicted even upon a
+_guilty_ man, when they consent to render a verdict which they have
+reason to believe will be used by the government as a justification for
+the infliction of such sentence.
+
+The consequence is, that jurors must have the whole case in their hands,
+and judge of law, evidence, and sentence, or they incur the moral
+responsibility of accomplices in any injustice which they have reason to
+believe will be done by the government on the authority of their
+verdict.
+
+The same principles apply to civil cases as to criminal. If a jury
+consent, at the dictation of the court, as to either law or evidence, to
+render a verdict, on the strength of which they have reason to believe
+that a man's property will be taken from him and given to another,
+against their own notions of justice, they make themselves morally
+responsible for the wrong.
+
+Every man, therefore, ought to refuse to sit in a jury, and to take the
+oath of a juror, unless the form of the oath be such as to allow him to
+use his own judgment, on every part of the case, free of all dictation
+whatsoever, and to hold in his own hand a veto upon any verdict that can
+be rendered against a defendant, and any sentence that can be inflicted
+upon him, even if he be guilty.
+
+Of course, no man can rightfully take an oath as juror, to try a case
+"according to law," (if by law be meant anything other than his own
+ideas of justice,) nor "according to the law and the evidence, _as they
+shall be given him_." Nor can he rightfully take an oath even to try a
+case "_according to the evidence_," because in all cases he may have
+good reason to believe that a party has been unable to produce all the
+evidence legitimately entitled to be received. The only oath which it
+would seem that a man can rightfully take as juror, in either a civil or
+criminal case, is, that he "will try the case _according to his
+conscience_." Of course, the form may admit of variation, but this
+should be the substance. Such, we have seen, were the ancient common law
+oaths.