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+APPENDIX.
+
+TAXATION.
+
+
+It was a principle of the Common Law, as it is of the law of nature, and
+of common sense, that no man can be taxed without his personal consent.
+The Common Law knew nothing of that system, which now prevails in
+England, of _assuming_ a man’s own consent to be taxed, because some
+pretended representative, whom he never authorized to act for him, has
+taken it upon himself to consent that he may be taxed. That is one of
+the many frauds on the Common Law, and the English constitution, which
+have been introduced since Magna Carta. Having finally established
+itself in England, it has been stupidly and servilely copied and
+submitted to in the United States.
+
+If the trial by jury were reëstablished, the Common Law principle of
+taxation would be reëstablished with it; for it is not to be supposed
+that juries would enforce a tax upon an individual which he had never
+agreed to pay. Taxation without consent is as plainly robbery, when
+enforced against one man, as when enforced against millions; and it is
+not to be imagined that juries could be blind to so self-evident a
+principle. Taking a man’s money without his consent, is also as much
+robbery, when it is done by millions of men, acting in concert, and
+calling themselves a government, as when it is done by a single
+individual, acting on his own responsibility, and calling himself a
+highwayman. Neither the numbers engaged in the act, nor the different
+characters they assume as a cover for the act, alter the nature of the
+act itself.
+
+If the government can take a man’s money without his consent, there is
+no limit to the additional tyranny it may practise upon him; for, with
+his money, it can hire soldiers to stand over him, keep him in
+subjection, plunder him at discretion, and kill him if he resists. And
+governments always will do this, as they everywhere and always have done
+it, except where the Common Law principle has been established. It is
+therefore a first principle, a very _sine qua non_ of political freedom,
+that a man can be taxed only by his personal consent. And the
+establishment of this principle, with _trial by jury_, insures freedom
+of course; because: 1. No man would pay his money unless he had first
+contracted for such a government as he was willing to support; and, 2.
+Unless the government then kept itself within the terms of its contract,
+juries would not enforce the payment of the tax. Besides, the agreement
+to be taxed would probably be entered into but for a year at a time. If,
+in that year, the government proved itself either inefficient or
+tyrannical, to any serious degree, the contract would not be renewed.
+The dissatisfied parties, if sufficiently numerous for a new
+organization, would form themselves into a separate association for
+mutual protection. If not sufficiently numerous for that purpose, those
+who were conscientious would forego all governmental protection, rather
+than contribute to the support of a government which they deemed unjust.
+
+All legitimate government is a mutual insurance company, voluntarily
+agreed upon by the parties to it, for the protection of their rights
+against wrong-doers. In its voluntary character it is precisely similar
+to an association for mutual protection against fire or shipwreck.
+Before a man will join an association for these latter purposes, and pay
+the premium for being insured, he will, if he be a man of sense, look at
+the articles of the association; see what the company promises to do;
+what it is likely to do; and what are the rates of insurance. If he be
+satisfied on all these points, he will become a member, pay his premium
+for a year, and then hold the company to its contract. If the conduct of
+the company prove unsatisfactory, he will let his policy expire at the
+end of the year for which he has paid; will decline to pay any further
+premiums, and either seek insurance elsewhere, or take his own risk
+without any insurance. And as men act in the insurance of their ships
+and dwellings, they would act in the insurance of their properties,
+liberties and lives, in the political association, or government.
+
+The political insurance company, or government, have no more right, in
+nature or reason, to _assume_ a man’s consent to be protected by them,
+and to be taxed for that protection, when he has given no actual
+consent, than a fire or marine insurance company have to assume a man’s
+consent to be protected by them, and to pay the premium, when his actual
+consent has never been given. To take a man’s property without his
+consent is robbery; and to assume his consent, where no actual consent
+is given, makes the taking none the less robbery. If it did, the
+highwayman has the same right to assume a man’s consent to part with his
+purse, that any other man, or body of men, can have. And his assumption
+would afford as much moral justification for his robbery as does a like
+assumption, on the part of the government, for taking a man’s property
+without his consent. The government’s pretence of protecting him, as an
+equivalent for the taxation, affords no justification. It is for himself
+to decide whether he desires such protection as the government offers
+him. If he do not desire it, or do not bargain for it, the government
+has no more right than any other insurance company to impose it upon
+him, or make him pay for it.
+
+Trial by the country, and no taxation without consent, were the two
+pillars of English liberty, (when England had any liberty,) and the
+first principles of the Common Law. They mutually sustain each other;
+and neither can stand without the other. Without both, no people have
+any guaranty for their freedom; with both, no people can be otherwise
+than free.[^118]
+
+By what force, fraud, and conspiracy, on the part of kings, nobles, and
+“a few wealthy freeholders,” these pillars have been prostrated in
+England, it is designed to show more fully in the next volume, if it
+should be necessary.
+
+[Footnote 118: Trial by the country, and no taxation without consent,
+mutually sustain each other, and can be sustained only by each other,
+for these reasons: 1. Juries would refuse to enforce a tax against a man
+who had never agreed to pay it. They would also protect men in forcibly
+resisting the collection of taxes to which they had never consented.
+Otherwise the jurors would authorize the government to tax themselves
+without their consent,—a thing which no jury would be likely to do. In
+these two ways, then, trial by the country would sustain the principle
+of no taxation without consent. 2. On the other hand, the principle of
+no taxation without consent would sustain the trial by the country,
+because men in general would not consent to be taxed for the support of
+a government under which trial by the country was not secured. Thus
+these two principles mutually sustain each other.
+
+But, if either of these principles were broken down, the other would
+fall with it, and for these reasons: 1. If trial by the country were
+broken down, the principle of no taxation without consent would fall
+with it, because the government would then be _able_ to tax the people
+without their consent, inasmuch as the legal tribunals would be mere
+tools of the government, and would enforce such taxation, and punish men
+for resisting such taxation, as the government ordered. 2. On the other
+hand, if the principle of no taxation without consent were broken down,
+trial by the country would fall with it, because the government, if it
+could tax people without their consent, would, of course, take enough of
+their money to enable it to employ all the force necessary for
+sustaining its own tribunals, (in the place of juries,) and carrying
+their decrees into execution.]