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@@ -678,77 +678,77 @@ decide the same question the other way, _unless they were misled by the
 justices_. If, however, such things should sometimes happen, from any
 cause whatever, the remedy is by appeal, and new trial.
 
-[Footnote 73: Judges do not even live up to that part of their own
-maxim, which requires jurors to try the matter of fact. By dictating to
-them the laws of evidence,—that is, by dictating what evidence they may
-hear, and what they may not hear, and also by dictating to them rules
-for weighing such evidence as they permit them to hear,—they of
-necessity dictate the conclusion to which they shall arrive. And thus
-the court really tries the question of fact, as well as the question of
-law, in every cause. It is clearly impossible, in the nature of things,
-for a jury to try a question of fact, without trying every question of
-law on which the fact depends.]
+[^73]: Judges do not even live up to that part of their own
+    maxim, which requires jurors to try the matter of fact. By dictating to
+    them the laws of evidence,—that is, by dictating what evidence they may
+    hear, and what they may not hear, and also by dictating to them rules
+    for weighing such evidence as they permit them to hear,—they of
+    necessity dictate the conclusion to which they shall arrive. And thus
+    the court really tries the question of fact, as well as the question of
+    law, in every cause. It is clearly impossible, in the nature of things,
+    for a jury to try a question of fact, without trying every question of
+    law on which the fact depends.
 
-[Footnote 74: Most disagreements of juries are on matters of fact, which
-are admitted to be within their province. We have little or no evidence
-of their disagreements on matters of natural justice. The disagreements
-of _courts_ on matters of law, afford little or no evidence that juries
-would also disagree on matters of law—that is, _of justice_; because
-the disagreements of courts are generally on matters of _legislation_,
-and not on those principles of abstract justice, by which juries would
-be governed, and in regard to which the minds of men are nearly
-unanimous.]
+[^74]: Most disagreements of juries are on matters of fact, which
+    are admitted to be within their province. We have little or no evidence
+    of their disagreements on matters of natural justice. The disagreements
+    of _courts_ on matters of law, afford little or no evidence that juries
+    would also disagree on matters of law—that is, _of justice_; because
+    the disagreements of courts are generally on matters of _legislation_,
+    and not on those principles of abstract justice, by which juries would
+    be governed, and in regard to which the minds of men are nearly
+    unanimous.
 
-[Footnote 75: This is the principle of all voluntary associations
-whatsoever. No voluntary association was ever formed, and in the nature
-of things there never can be one formed, for the accomplishment of any
-objects except those in which all the parties to the association are
-agreed. Government, therefore, must be kept within these limits, or it
-is no longer a voluntary association of all who contribute to its
-support, but a mere tyranny established by a part over the rest.
+[^75]: This is the principle of all voluntary associations
+    whatsoever. No voluntary association was ever formed, and in the nature
+    of things there never can be one formed, for the accomplishment of any
+    objects except those in which all the parties to the association are
+    agreed. Government, therefore, must be kept within these limits, or it
+    is no longer a voluntary association of all who contribute to its
+    support, but a mere tyranny established by a part over the rest.
+    
+    All, or nearly all, voluntary associations give to a majority, or to
+    some other portion of the members less than the whole, the right to use
+    some _limited_ discretion as to the means to be used to accomplish the
+    ends in view; but _the ends themselves to be accomplished_ are always
+    precisely defined, and are such as every member necessarily agrees to,
+    else he would not voluntarily join the association.
+    
+    Justice is the object of government, and those who support the
+    government, must be agreed as to the justice to be executed by it, or
+    they cannot rightfully unite in maintaining the government itself.
 
-All, or nearly all, voluntary associations give to a majority, or to
-some other portion of the members less than the whole, the right to use
-some _limited_ discretion as to the means to be used to accomplish the
-ends in view; but _the ends themselves to be accomplished_ are always
-precisely defined, and are such as every member necessarily agrees to,
-else he would not voluntarily join the association.
+[^76]: Jones on Bailments, 133.
 
-Justice is the object of government, and those who support the
-government, must be agreed as to the justice to be executed by it, or
-they cannot rightfully unite in maintaining the government itself.]
+[^77]: Kent, describing the difficulty of construing the written
+    law, says:
+    
+    “Such is the imperfection of language, and the want of technical skill
+    in the makers of the law, that statutes often give occasion to the most
+    perplexing and distressing doubts and discussions, arising from the
+    ambiguity that attends them. It requires great experience, as well as
+    the command of a perspicuous diction, to frame a law in such clear and
+    precise terms, as to secure it from ambiguous expressions, and from all
+    doubts and criticisms upon its meaning.”—_Kent_, 460.
+    
+    The following extract from a speech of Lord Brougham, in the House of
+    Lords, confesses the same difficulty:
+    
+    “There was another subject, well worthy of the consideration of
+    government during the recess,—the expediency, _or rather the absolute
+    necessity_, of some arrangement for the preparation of bills, not merely
+    private, but public bills, _in order that legislation might be
+    consistent and systematic, and that the courts might not have so large a
+    portion of their time occupied in endeavoring to construe acts of
+    Parliament, in many cases unconstruable, and in most cases difficult to
+    be construed_.”—_Law Reporter_, 1848, p. 525.
 
-[Footnote 76: Jones on Bailments, 133.]
-
-[Footnote 77: Kent, describing the difficulty of construing the written
-law, says:
-
-“Such is the imperfection of language, and the want of technical skill
-in the makers of the law, that statutes often give occasion to the most
-perplexing and distressing doubts and discussions, arising from the
-ambiguity that attends them. It requires great experience, as well as
-the command of a perspicuous diction, to frame a law in such clear and
-precise terms, as to secure it from ambiguous expressions, and from all
-doubts and criticisms upon its meaning.”—_Kent_, 460.
-
-The following extract from a speech of Lord Brougham, in the House of
-Lords, confesses the same difficulty:
-
-“There was another subject, well worthy of the consideration of
-government during the recess,—the expediency, _or rather the absolute
-necessity_, of some arrangement for the preparation of bills, not merely
-private, but public bills, _in order that legislation might be
-consistent and systematic, and that the courts might not have so large a
-portion of their time occupied in endeavoring to construe acts of
-Parliament, in many cases unconstruable, and in most cases difficult to
-be construed_.”—_Law Reporter_, 1848, p. 525.]
-
-[Footnote 78: This condemnation of written laws must, of course, be
-understood as applying only to cases where principles and rights are
-involved, and not as condemning any governmental arrangements, or
-instrumentalities, that are consistent with natural right, and which
-must be agreed upon for the purpose of carrying natural law into effect.
-These things may be varied, as expediency may dictate, so only that they
-be allowed to infringe no principle of justice. And they must, of
-course, be written, because they do not exist as fixed principles, or
-laws in nature.]
+[^78]: This condemnation of written laws must, of course, be
+    understood as applying only to cases where principles and rights are
+    involved, and not as condemning any governmental arrangements, or
+    instrumentalities, that are consistent with natural right, and which
+    must be agreed upon for the purpose of carrying natural law into effect.
+    These things may be varied, as expediency may dictate, so only that they
+    be allowed to infringe no principle of justice. And they must, of
+    course, be written, because they do not exist as fixed principles, or
+    laws in nature.