101 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
101 lines
5.4 KiB
Markdown
CHAPTER X.
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MORAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR JURORS.
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The trial by jury must, if possible, be construed to be such that a man
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can rightfully sit in a jury, and unite with his fellows in giving
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judgment. But no man can rightfully do this, unless he hold in his own
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hand alone a veto upon any judgment or sentence whatever to be rendered
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by the jury against a defendant, which veto he must be permitted to use
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according to his own discretion and conscience, and not bound to use
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according to the dictation of either legislatures or judges.
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The prevalent idea, that a juror may, at the mere dictation of a
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legislature or a judge, and without the concurrence of his own
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conscience or understanding, declare a man "_guilty_," and thus in
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effect license the government to punish him; and that the legislature or
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the judge, and not himself, has in that case all the moral
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responsibility for the correctness of the principles on which the
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judgment was rendered, is one of the many gross impostures by which it
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could hardly have been supposed that any sane man could ever have been
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deluded, but which governments have nevertheless succeeded in inducing
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the people at large to receive and act upon.
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As a moral proposition, it is perfectly self-evident that, unless juries
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have all the legal rights that have been claimed for them in the
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preceding chapters,--that is, the rights of judging what the law is,
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whether the law be a just one, what evidence is admissible, what weight
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the evidence is entitled to, whether an act were done with a criminal
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intent, and the right also to _limit_ the sentence, free of all
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dictation from any quarter,--they have no _moral_ right to sit in the
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trial at all, and cannot do so without making themselves accomplices in
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any injustice that they may have reason to believe may result from
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their verdict. It is absurd to say that they have no moral
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responsibility for the use that may be made of their verdict by the
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government, when they have reason to suppose it will be used for
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purposes of injustice.
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It is, for instance, manifestly absurd to say that jurors have no moral
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responsibility for the enforcement of an unjust law, when they consent
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to render a verdict of _guilty_ for the transgression of it; which
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verdict they know, or have good reason to believe, will be used by the
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government as a justification for inflicting a penalty.
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It is absurd, also, to say that jurors have no moral responsibility for
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a punishment inflicted upon a man _against law_, when, at the dictation
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of a judge as to what the law is, they have consented to render a
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verdict against their own opinions of the law.
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It is absurd, too, to say that jurors have no moral responsibility for
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the conviction and punishment of an innocent man, when they consent to
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render a verdict against him on the strength of evidence, or laws of
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evidence, dictated to them by the court, if any evidence or laws of
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evidence have been excluded, which _they_ (the jurors) think ought to
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have been admitted in his defence.
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It is absurd to say that jurors have no moral responsibility for
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rendering a verdict of "_guilty_" against a man, for an act which he did
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not know to be a crime, and in the commission of which, therefore, he
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could have had no criminal intent, in obedience to the instructions of
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courts that "ignorance of the law (that is, of crime) excuses no one."
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It is absurd, also, to say that jurors have no moral responsibility for
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any cruel or unreasonable _sentence_ that may be inflicted even upon a
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_guilty_ man, when they consent to render a verdict which they have
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reason to believe will be used by the government as a justification for
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the infliction of such sentence.
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The consequence is, that jurors must have the whole case in their hands,
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and judge of law, evidence, and sentence, or they incur the moral
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responsibility of accomplices in any injustice which they have reason to
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believe will be done by the government on the authority of their
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verdict.
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The same principles apply to civil cases as to criminal. If a jury
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consent, at the dictation of the court, as to either law or evidence, to
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render a verdict, on the strength of which they have reason to believe
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that a man's property will be taken from him and given to another,
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against their own notions of justice, they make themselves morally
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responsible for the wrong.
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Every man, therefore, ought to refuse to sit in a jury, and to take the
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oath of a juror, unless the form of the oath be such as to allow him to
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use his own judgment, on every part of the case, free of all dictation
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whatsoever, and to hold in his own hand a veto upon any verdict that can
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be rendered against a defendant, and any sentence that can be inflicted
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upon him, even if he be guilty.
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Of course, no man can rightfully take an oath as juror, to try a case
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"according to law," (if by law be meant anything other than his own
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ideas of justice,) nor "according to the law and the evidence, _as they
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shall be given him_." Nor can he rightfully take an oath even to try a
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case "_according to the evidence_," because in all cases he may have
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good reason to believe that a party has been unable to produce all the
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evidence legitimately entitled to be received. The only oath which it
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would seem that a man can rightfully take as juror, in either a civil or
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criminal case, is, that he "will try the case _according to his
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conscience_." Of course, the form may admit of variation, but this
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should be the substance. Such, we have seen, were the ancient common law
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oaths.
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